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THE MARKETABILITY OF ARMY OFFICERS

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THE MARKETABILITY OF ARMY OFFICERS

by

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PROFESSIONAL REPORT

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ABSTRACT

America's competitiveness in the international environment depends upon its ability to employ an educated and productive work force. Management's role is critical to this task, because it must prove itself to be innovative, caring, and adaptable. Usually, employers search out business schools and the civilian labor market for their potential executives. However, they are overlooking a valuable source of junior leaders and managers: The United States Army's officer corps. Although business and the Army have different missions, the leadership and managerial training that junior officers experience provides business a competitive advantage.

The Army fosters this relationship. The Congressional mandate to shrink the force challenges Army leaders to maintain an effective fighting force. Thus, competent leadership is paramount to this goal. However, this can occur only if quality young men and women are attracted to the Army's officer corps with the intention of using it as a career enhancer.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This paper provides business an insight into a valuable source of junior leaders and managers: Army officers. Much of what is discussed refers to veterans in general. However, analogous to business executives and their employees, officers too receive additional formal and informal training. Thus, one can infer that an officer would prove to be an even greater asset. The focus of this study centers on two parameters: (1) officers with eight or less years of service and (2) combat arms officers (air defense artillery, armor, artillery, and infantry branches).

The rationale for the first parameter is that these officers who depart the service optimally benefit both the Army and business. The rationale for the second parameter is that the combat arms officer concentrates on war fighting skills, while the combat support (CS) and the combat service support (CSS) officers concentrate more on technical skills with a focus on the civilian job market (Caforio, 1988). In other words, CS and CSS officers are perceived as possessing skills related to the private sector. Combat arms officers are perceived as possessing skills related only to war fighting.

Chapter II presents an overview of the effects on

earnings of the human capital theory. Secondly, it discusses the rates of return for both military and non-military personnel.

Chapter III discusses changes in the work force and in the economy that the Army and business leaders alike must manage.

Chapter IV discusses why these officers who serve in the Army and then depart for the private sector provide an optimal benefit to both the Army and to business.

Chapter V describes the Army's Officer Professional Development theory and then applies it by presenting a generic career path of a combat arms officer from pre-commissioning through a company level command (approximately eight years after being commissioned).

Chapter VI presents the surveyed responses of a cross section of business presidents as to their opinions on employing former Army officers. While not statistically analyzed, the data do support the current literature on the marketability of veterans.

Chapter VII discusses the study's conclusions, and it makes recommendations for future research.

CHAPTER II

HUMAN CAPITAL THEORY

An economist (Schultz, 1961) revolutionized the concept of human capital. He believed that even though economists acknowledge human capital as a factor of production, many view it negatively, because it often connoted images of slave labor or mistreatment of workers. Schultz presented the concept positively, for he viewed the individual as a catalyst to the process: "...people invest in themselves and these investments [that they make] are very large" (2). An individual invests in himself because it broadens the opportunities available to him.

Similar to other decisions, an individual decides to invest in himself based upon an informally conducted (usually) cost/benefit analysis. Here each alternative is evaluated on its merits and demerits. Then the individual decides on a course of action based upon the alternative with the most favorable outcome.

Another economist (Becker, 1964 and 1975) identified specific human capital investments that an individual considers. Some of them are schooling, on the job training, and medical care. The purpose of each of these is to "...improve knowledge, skills, or health, and thereby raise money or psychic income"

Schooling

This type of education takes place outside the organization. It includes both technical schools that specialize in one skill and universities that teach broad subject knowledge. The medium used depends upon the desired skill. For instance, the ideal location for construction experience is on the job training, while a scientist learns best through a formal education. Other types of skills are more conducive to both on the job training and formal education. This Army uses the latter.

While a student is in school, his earnings are less than they would have been if he wasn't in school. When the costs of schooling are factored in, the earnings are even less. This can be written as the following:

$$W = MP - k,$$

where W is net earnings, MP is the marginal product of earnings, and k is the direct costs of schooling (tuition, books, lodging, and transportation). When one considers the wages that could have been earned, the formula can be rewritten as the following:

$$W = MP_o - C,$$

where MP_o is the marginal product that could have been earned, and C is the sum of all direct and indirect costs of schooling.

An Army cadet, in either West Point or ROTC, has an

advantage over his civilian counterparts. The West Point cadet has most of his direct costs of schooling paid for by the government (room, board, tuition, and medical care). Those not covered (uniforms and books) are paid for by the cadet from a yearly salary that he receives while he attends the academy. Currently, this annual income is over \$6,500. The ROTC cadet's advantage is dependent upon other factors. The cadet must apply for a federal scholarship which covers tuition, fees, books, and supplies. The cadet must pay other direct costs such as lodging and transportation. However, both the cadet with a scholarship and the cadet without a scholarship receive \$100 per school month during the advanced program of ROTC. This is normally the last two years of one's college education.

On the Job Training.

This human capital investment is accomplished in the work place. Productivity increases because a worker learns new skills and refines old skills. Becker (1975) described two types: general and specific.

General training benefits more than one industry, for the worker's marginal productivity can increase not only in the current job but in any other jobs that he may choose. What then is the motivation for a profit maxi-

mizing firm to provide general training if a rate of return isn't guaranteed? Simply stated, a firm pays for general training by paying a trainee (W_o) his opportunity marginal product (MPO) minus the cost of training (k). This can be written as the following:

$$W_o = MPO - k$$

The Army also follows this principle, however, in the past it often proved itself to be costly. Because even after a trainee completes his training, the Army still doesn't pay market wages. Rather it attempts to compensate a soldier in other ways: commissary privileges, free health care, housing, and a food allowance. Thus, an individual who had learned a wide range of skills that are applicable in business would leave the Army after his first or second enlistment to earn more in the private sector. Now with a weak economy and a Congressional directive to shrink the force, the Army is able to be more selective as to whom it wants to retain.

Specific training is unique to a given firm; there would be no increase in productivity for another firm. This type of training equally benefits an employee and the firm. The worker is less inclined to quit, and the firm is less likely to release him than if he was generally trained. The obvious reasons are that the worker would have difficulty in finding another job, and the firm has

invested too much in the worker to release him.

While it can be argued that combat arms officers receive only specific training, this study discusses how it is a combination of both specific and general training. This means that they can be an asset to business.

Medical Investment

Becker (1975) stressed the importance of both emotional and physical health care investments. Each year employers spend over \$100 billion on their employees' health care, yet this represents a reactive instead of a proactive situation (CED, 1990): Most employers are not concerned until a problem occurs. If a firm requires frequent medical examinations or if it provides facilities for its workers' mental and physical well being, then it is investing in its workers' productivity. Unfortunately, employers don't universally accept these employee assistant programs (EAPs).

This is an area in which the Army has done extremely well. Modern, well equipped fitness centers that cater to the soldiers' and the families' needs are evident on all major military installations. The Army requires physical training (PT) on a daily basis and a PT test once every six months. Soldiers must undergo a complete medical examination every few years. They must also be weighed quarterly to ensure that they meet height and weight stan-

dards. Those failing to meet the standards are put on a special program supervised by a dietitian. If an overweight soldier fails to meet the standards after a specified period, then he may be separated from the service.

Drug and alcohol addiction counseling and rehabilitation is no longer punitive in nature. A soldier who willingly enrolls himself into the program is cared for, and once he is cured, he may return to duty. However, if an individual is caught with drugs or is convicted of either a DUI or a DWI, then the measures also include punitive actions.

These human capital investments serve the soldier and subsequently the veteran/employee by instilling in him a sense of discipline that often follows one throughout his lifetime. Employers who hire veterans can be sure of gaining quality employees.

Rates of Return for Military versus Non-Military

If an individual makes investments in himself, then he needs to decide if the Army is a worthwhile investment. In other words, based upon the various options available--college, civilian employment, or the military--will the Army be viewed by future employers as an asset or a liability? According to Andrisani and Daymont (1991):

...military service provides, at least to a degree, the means to obtain civilian employment and enhance lifetime earnings. We therefore hypothesize that the civilian earnings of veterans will rise more quickly than the earnings of civilians of comparable ages... (6).

An assumption that they made was that the rates of return for military service are dependent upon the point in time at which the earnings are measured. In order to unbiasedly judge veterans who are college bound, at least eight years after leaving the service are needed before one can compare them with non-veteran college graduates. This provides the veterans four years of college and four years of civilian career experience to demonstrate their civilian career earnings capacity. However, the non-veterans will have a total of eight years of civilian experience.

Note that while their study didn't differentiate between officers and soldiers, one can infer that because all West Point and ROTC officers have their college degrees and eight percent have advanced degrees (OPMD, 1992), a comparison with their civilian counterparts at the four year mark of employment can probably be made.

A summary of Andrisani's and Daymont's conclusions are listed below:

(1) No veterans' penalty during the All Volunteer Force (AVF) Era [of the 1970s] was observed for either male or female veterans.

(2) The 'frictional' (transitional and temporary) unemployment problems of military youths upon leaving the service appear similar to those observed for their civilian counterparts when they initially entered the civilian work force upon leaving high school.

(3) Work bound youths definitely appeared to benefit from military service irrespective of the branch in which they served or whether it was in a combat or technical MOS [military occupational specialty].

(4) The sustained steeper slope of veterans' earnings trajectories suggests the possibility that civilian employers initially undervalue skills obtained in the military.... Negative images of the military resulting from the Vietnam War and the recruiting scandals of the AVF may have caused employers initially to underestimate the skills and potential of veterans until they were proven in the civilian sector. The same may hold true today given the attention of the media to recent findings of a veterans' penalty (75).

Military Service: Penalty or Premium

The veterans' penalty that Andrisani and Daymont allude to is the study done by Angrist (1990). He found that compared to the veterans' civilian counterparts, non-white veterans showed no change in earnings while white veterans showed a decrease in earnings compared to a loss of two years in the civilian labor market.

Angrist seems to be a lone dissenting voice among other researchers. Besides the Andrisani and Daymont study, Detray (1982) concluded that military service provides employers valuable information as to the productivity of possible employees. He stated:

....these types [military service] of human capital investments account for differences in wages between veterans and nonveterans, the veteran premium may be a legitimate return to military service. (133).

In a separate study, Magnum and Ball (1989) concluded that "within two years of their return to civilian life, those who receive military training had higher earnings than those who received training in the civilian sector..." (230).

According to Andrisani and Daymont, one of the many flaws in the Angrist study is that it doesn't compare veterans and nonveterans, rather the study, through the draft lottery concept, compares those **at risk of the draft** and those **not at risk of the draft**. Yet this comparison

fails to accurately portray the situation. For instance, many of the **at risk** category weren't drafted because they relocated to avoid the draft or were rejected by the Army. Many of the **not at risk of the draft** volunteered. As a result, the military may not be the cause of the low earnings. Rather the choices that some used to avoid or postpone the draft may have been the cause of the low earnings.

CHAPTER III

WORK FORCE SITUATION

This chapter discusses the changes that are taking place in the work force that both the Army and business leaders must learn to manage.

There has been a lot of publicity in recent years about America's decaying infrastructure as well as a failure of its school systems. This neglect is causing America to lose its competitive edge. In a recent issue of Foreign Affairs, Robert Hormats, the former Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs states:

Such success [Desert Storm] was made possible by an underlying economy able to turn out great volumes of extremely advanced military equipment and software as well as men and women skilled in operating them. The U.S. economy would not have been capable of doing this but for a history of high American savings and enormous investment in education [my emphasis], industry, science, technology and the infrastructure to link these elements together. Savings and investments of earlier years were not intended primarily to bolster America's capacity to send well-equipped forces overseas, but they had the derivative effect of making that possible and, more generally, of strengthening the foundations of American global

power--political and economic, as well a military (132).

Educational Deficiencies

According to an education survey (Harris and Wagner, 1991) 88 percent of the public (former students four to eight years out of high school and the parents of such students) state that the U.S. needs higher standards in order to be internationally competitive. This was echoed by 95 percent of employers (business and government).

Both groups felt higher standards were needed in mathematical and communicative skills. They also felt higher standards were needed in such diverse areas as teamwork building, proper grooming habits, respect for authority, ability to learn, and discipline.

The catalyst for improving education should be the structural changes occurring in the economy. According to the Department of Labor by the year 2000, professional and managerial jobs are projected to increase by 6.7 million, while low skill jobs are projected to increase by a mere 450,000. These changes reflect a need for additional education. Even though a high school diploma (12 years of schooling) will remain the highest education level required for most jobs (Table 1), its share of new jobs is projected to decrease by 12.5 percent. While a college degree (16

years of schooling) or an advanced degree is projected to increase by 36.36 percent.

TABLE 1
EDUCATION LEVELS FOR OCCUPATIONS OF THE FUTURE

Yrs of Schooling	Current Jobs	New Jobs
1 to 8	6%	3%
9 to 11	12%	10%
12	40%	35%
13 to 15	20%	22%
16 +	22%	30%
Total	100%	100%
Median Years	12.8	13.5

Source: Hudson Institute

Demographic changes are also taking place in the work place. The Hudson Institute (Johnston and Packer, 1987) identifies five evolutionary changes by the year 2000:

- * The population and the work force will grow more slowly than at any time since the 1930s.
- * The average age of the population and the work

force will rise, and the pool of young workers entering the labor market will shrink.

- * More women will enter the work force, although the rate of increase will taper off.
- * Minorities will be a larger share of new entrants into the labor force.
- * Immigrants will represent the largest share of the increase in the population and the work force since the First World War (75).

Business Involvement

The demographic changes require both business and the Army to rethink their current policies in order to be more adaptable to the changing work force. However, a more immediate concern is the failure of the education system to properly train students to be productive employees. To solve this problem, education and business institutions can no longer be viewed as separate entities. Because schools are unable to meet business' minimum standards, an education-work linkage must be formed to ensure America's productivity in the 21st Century. The Committee for Economic Development (CED) identifies four key elements to this relationship:

- * Stronger business support for effective education.
- * Clearer identification of employability skills to

guide educators.

* A smooth transition for students from school to work at multiple points.

* Improved entry-level training within business.

These elements are all noteworthy, however, there are costs associated with them. That is why the Army's role as a source of junior leaders and managers is critical; there is no direct cost to business (excluding corporate income taxes).

Each year business spends over \$30 billion on formal education and \$90 billion to \$180 billion on informal training (CED, 1990). Informal training includes on the job training. This constitutes about one percent of a given firm's payroll. Proactive firms usually spend three to four percent of their respective payrolls on training. Additionally, firms must project funds for entry level training, because employees don't meet their minimum standards. This training includes simple mathematics, reading, ethics, values, and personal hygiene. While firms are expected to teach general and specific training, it is unfortunate that they have to divest dollars into these areas as well.

Several examples of businesses confronting the problem head on is IBM's Job Training Centers, Aetna's Life and Casualty's Institute for Corporate Education, and Burger

King's "private-sector GI Bill (CED, 1990). IBM sponsors 70 centers nationwide at an average cost of \$3,100 per student. Aetna teaches entry level skills to almost 20,000 employees a year. And Burger King provides special education and training at a cost of \$2,000 per employee depending upon one's length of service. In each case the objective is to train an unskilled or low skilled work force to minimum entry level standards.

However, these examples are the exception and not the norm. Often firms are short-term profit oriented and so training becomes a cost instead of an investment (Pennar, 1988). Or a more likely scenario is for firms to invest in selected professionals and technicians because of the exorbitant costs of formal education. Over the past several years, there have been numerous views on how to rejuvenate business' interest in employees' training.

In a recent issue of Academy of Management Executive, three authors (Hitt, Hoskisson, and Harrison, 1991) emphasize the importance of investing in human capital in order to remain internationally competitive. In another example, Edward Dennison, an expert in growth economics, states that a major factor of the Gross National Product's steady increase from 1948 to 1982 was due to the significant investments in human capital (Nussbaum, 1988).

Governmental measures at the state level which foster job training include the California Employment Training Panel and the Delaware Blue Collar Jobs Act. At the national level, CED recommends that there should be changes in the unemployment insurance and the employment service systems. Due to the changes in the work force and the economy, these systems now hinder displaced workers or job seekers more than they help them.

While all of these measures are commendable, they are also costly. However, there is another CED recommendation that is equally viable and less costly. This initiative recommends that business employs those military personnel who are voluntarily leaving the service or are being discharged due to Congressional directives to reduce the force. The focus of this study, however, is to concentrate on those Army officers who have served eight or less years in the Army. It is this group that optimally benefits both the Army and business.

CHAPTER IV

ARMY AND BUSINESS BENEFITS

The intent is not to present officers as a panacea for all of business' managerial problems. Rather the intent is to present officers as a source from which business can hire junior leaders and managers. Drawing from the Army allows firms to build upon the veterans' solid personal and work ethic foundation. They can then assimilate these veteran officers into their respective cultures. Obviously, the Army's goal isn't totally altruistic. By promoting itself as a stepping stone to greater opportunities the Army can be sure of attracting highly qualified college graduates into its ranks as commissioned officers.

Two researchers (Broom and Smith, 1963) discuss this concept of how the military represents a "bridging occupation." A bridging occupation allows for work experience and mobility from one job to another. They state that the bridge between the military and business has been enhanced due to four major trends:

Technology convergence between military and civilian sectors, growing similarities between military and civil administration, increased demand for manpower, and the recognition that ex-servicemen should be assisted in finding meaningful employment after service (322).

Benefits to the Army

The Army's primary mission has always been to organize, train, and equip land forces to defend the U.S.' interests anywhere in the world. However, with the end of the Cold War, the emphasis has switched from a threat-based force to a capabilities force (USA Posture Statement, 1992). This means that the Army must train for a myriad of military operations ranging from drug intervention to regional conflicts. In the past two years, there have been two major tests of America's determination to defend its interests: JUST CAUSE in Panama and DESERT STORM in the Middle East. Both of these successful military operations demonstrate the importance of having competent leaders in the Army.

Unfortunately, the country's history has proven that after winning the foreign war, the military often loses the subsequent domestic war. Congress becomes the victor and the military becomes the vanquished as the former mandates deep cuts in the military's budget. This challenges the military leaders to maintain a viable force. Thus, in accordance with the Administration's Defense Management Improvement Act and the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (USA Posture Statement, 1991), the Army, like the other services, is to reduce a significant portion of its active duty personnel (Table 2). However, the Army is cognizant of the fact that it doesn't need as many officers

in the senior ranks as it does in the junior ranks (Figure 1).

TABLE 2
CURRENT STRENGTH/PROJECTED REDUCTIONS

	All officers	LTS/CPTs	Percent**
Active Duty*	101,771	53,796	53%
Reductions:			
1993	12,729	5,844	46%
1994	11,473	5,963	52%
1995	10,533	5,046	48%
1996	6,622	3,241	49%

* Current strength as of 31 December 1991


** Represents the ratio of LTS/CPTs to all officers

Source: Officer Personnel Management Directorate

To manage this reduction, the Army plans for natural or forced attrition within its ranks. Through an evolutionary process some officers will serve a tour or two and then depart for the private sector. Others will remain on active duty, because they simply want to be officers. This isn't

FIGURE 1

OFFICER REQUIREMENTS



As of 30 September 1991

an idealistic view point. A survey of why cadets' enrolled into ROTC shows 63 percent wanted to be officers. Sixty-two percent wanted the leadership experience, and 36 percent stated that they enrolled because it looks good on a resume (ROTC Cadet Command, 1991).

Those that depart the service, voluntarily or involuntarily, can find their transitional burden eased through the Army Career and Alumni Program (ACAP). Its purpose is "...to provide a comprehensive system to assist personnel leaving the Army in a caring, disciplined, and organized manner, with a strong emphasis on retaining quality" (ACAP, 1990). It accomplishes this through 67 Transition Assistance Offices (TAO's) and 57 Contracted Job Assistance Centers (JAC's) throughout the U.S. and overseas.

The TAO representatives evaluate the needs of the departing soldiers and officers, and then they prepare a transition plan tailored to the their specific needs. The JAC representatives assist the soldiers and officers with job searching skills, workshops, seminars, resumes, individual counseling, and the automated Army Employment Network (AEN) database.

The AEN serves as a tool for meeting the employers' demands with the supply of Army Alumni. It is a dynamic database composed of both local and national employers. Currently, there are approximately 2,000 firms represented

by various industries including the Ford Corporation, Marriott Hotels, Eastman Kodak, Black and Decker, and Metropolitan Life Insurance who are committed to the program. Another 2,000 employers are considered potential candidates. When an employer commits itself to AEN it agrees to: (1) participate in the ACAP by agreeing to consider hiring Army Alumni; (2) participate in the National Guard and Reserve Programs; (3) support the Equal Opportunity Program.

Benefits to Business

As the Andrisani and Daymont study mentioned, many employers have reservations about veterans, however, their attitudes tend to become favorable as employers view the work ethics of veterans over time.

The Army's officer corps also suffers from these incorrect assumptions. Recent events such as the Persian Gulf War are presented as if General Schwarzkopf won the war single handily! It needs to be understood that thousands of professionally trained officers leading tens of thousands of quality soldiers won the war. Another incorrect assumption is that retired officers are prone to be hired by a brotherhood of business firms that are in collusion with the military-industrial complex. Many retired officers join defense-related industries, however, it appears that they

were hired for their knowledge and experience and not as a reward for past favors (Hong, 1979). He goes on to state:

In fact, the number of years they served in the Pentagon or in a unit that coordinates and controls procurement activities, ...is not significantly correlated with the probability of being employed in defense related firms (456).

Other concerns are more puzzling. Employers acknowledge the military's ability to produce hardworking, loyal, and experienced managers capable of managing large projects early in their lives, yet these same employers see no benefit in these general attributes; they want veterans who have specific training skills related to a given industry (Novack, 1991).

These employers are misinformed as to the benefits of hiring Army veteran officers. Winning, whether on the battlefield or in the market, is a frame of mind. Many business professionals understand this and use military strategies in business (Rogers, 1989). One financial consultant astutely points out how the Nine Principles of War can help you beat the competition (Bettinger, 1989). The revolutionary concepts in executive training such as team building and basic training camps have long been practiced in the Army. Lastly, Time Magazine's 1991 Man of the Year and President of Turner Broadcasting, Ted

Turner, among others, openly states how military service positively influenced how he conducted business (Ramsey, 1987).

These professionals have realized the value of Army training. For the key to being successful is the ability to find good, smart young people and [to] train them (Gallese, 1989). But training has to be for a loftier goal than earning higher profits. As one executive states:

You're never going to get anyone to charge the machine guns only for financial objectives. It's got to be for something that makes them feel better, feel part of something (Dumaine, 1989, 50).

Army officers understand this; it is instilled in young cadets before they are commissioned, and it continues all through their respective careers.

Officers versus civilians. A study conducted by the Department of the Army's ROTC Cadet Command and several recruitment and placement services for both civilians and veteran officers concluded:

- * 50 percent of top managers in Fortune 500 companies were junior military officers.
- * 20 percent of all college graduates compared to 70 percent of all junior military officers make it to business' middle level management positions.

- * Leadership and management skills: College graduates have limited skills which orient on the theory aspects, whereas junior military officers have formal training and experience.
- * Adaptability: College graduates, except for their college years, are not accustomed to periodic moves. Junior military officers experience at least four moves within their first six years of service. Often these moves are overseas.

Business values the junior Army officers' interpersonal and decision making skills as well as their ability to handle responsibility. Corporations such as Goodyear, Chase Manhattan, Union Carbide, Procter and Gamble, Dow Chemical, Du Pont, 3M, and ITT actively commit themselves to supporting these veterans because of the skills they bring into the work place (The Margin of Difference, 1985).

According to a survey of American businesses conducted by CED (Elig, Benedict, and Gilroy, 1990), Army veterans possess those work ethics that employers value most for entry level positions. These are striving to work well, learning, priority-setting, communicating, working well with others, dependability, pride, enthusiasm, and listening carefully to instructions and then correctly carrying them out. Of equal importance is that these general attributes were rated as being more important than specific job skills.

A study conducted by the Department of Labor discussed the merits of veterans:

In general, the veteran of year 2000 will have been exposed to more varied job experience and required to obtain higher technological skills than the average labor force entrants. As a minimum, even those whose military service was limited to the purely military specialty areas such as riflemen, cannoneer, and ammunition handler will have received training and achieved acceptable skill levels in supportive work areas of equipment operations and maintenance, safety hygiene and sanitation, and the use and care of hand tools. Moreover, the veteran will have developed an understanding of the need to maintain good work habits, to receive and comprehend oral and visual instructions, to remain drug free and to give substantive and meaningful reports of work status. [Many] will have received training and become skilled in high technology fields such as electronics, electronics, engineering, communications, aviation and navigation, and will have improved their fundamental skills in reading, math, and reasoning (18).

Even though officers master these tangible skills, their experience in intangible skills such as interpersonal

communications is becoming increasingly important.

A survey conducted by Business Month found that more than half of the responding CEOs state that employee relations is one of the major activities that they are devoting more time to over the next few years. This is up from less than one quarter in 1988 (Murray, 1989). In a separate study conducted by the American Assembly of Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB), corporate recruiters are searching for candidates who have leadership and interpersonal experiences. This includes those with MBAs (Meeks, 1988). The study went on to conclude that colleges are not providing these skills and that:

...former military officers come aboard with an edge. Unlike your typical young American, people trained in the military know what it is like to get their orders both obeyed and respected. 'They know what it's like to manage people, to manage a function and to manage a budget. They've got good business savvy' (188).

The Army emphasizes interpersonal communications because it understands how sexual and racial problems can undermine morale. Since the racial problems of the 1960s and the 1970s, the Army has put a greater emphasis on promoting awareness to these problems. More importantly, it has punitive measures for those found guilty of sexual or racial discrimination. And while many managers in

business do not find it palatable to work closely with women or with other races, the Army officer learns early on how to effectively work with others.

Accepting women as co-workers is paramount to getting the mission accomplished. Within the air defense artillery and the artillery branches platoon leaders and commanders may have women within their respective units, or the platoon leader or commander may very well be a woman. And while Congress prohibits women from serving in the armor or infantry branches, these platoon leaders and commanders must learn to work with women who are in the combat support and combat service support branches.

The number of blacks serving in the Army is 198,587 of which five percent are commissioned officers. The number of women serving in the Army is 78,080 of which 15 percent are commissioned officers (OPMD, 1992). Together they represent more than twice the business' average of nine percent (Leinster, 1988). Thus any organization, including the Army, will have race and gender problems, however, "...these are minimal compared with the problems that exist in other institutions, public and private" (Moskos, 1986, 64).

But effectively managing these issues requires a new way of thinking on the part of America's leaders both in the Army and in business. However, this is a clear advantage that the Army officer has over his civilian

counterparts. The dependability and the trust that develop between soldiers and officers regardless of race or gender prove to be a quality that will normally stay with the young officer all through his or her life as one makes the transition from the Army to the private sector.

However, there are key differences between Army and business cultures. This means that there needs to be a transitional period for the veteran in order to become acclimated to the respective firm's culture.

The most obvious difference is that most business enterprises are profit entities, while the Army exists to defend the interests of the U.S. This requires the latter's work force to perform tasks unheard of in the business community such as sacrificing one's life.

A less dramatic yet equally important example is how each uses job descriptions. The Army uses broad statements because it expects an officer to know what to do without being told. Ambiguous situations require an officer to solve them in one's own way while keeping superiors informed (Locurio, 1988). This system is needed due to the complexity and uncertainty of warfare. Communications and guidance from superiors aren't always guaranteed so ingenuity and resourcefulness are paramount. A civilian works in an environment that is relatively stable and well delineated. This facilitates a job description that is

narrowly defined. This helps him orient his efforts and to understand how one will be evaluated.

Another key difference is the concept of "taking charge of the situation." The Army officer, due to his training, is compelled to exert firm authority over an organization because the span of control is broad. His perception is that this is the only way to manage an organization in which he is responsible for everything the unit does or fails to do. The civilian organization normally has a narrow span of control which facilitates a more decentralized operation.

Yet the stereotype of the Army as a highly centralized and authoritarian system versus business' de-centralized and democratic system shouldn't prevail. Each culture has leaders that employ each of the aforementioned systems. Another author, Van Fleet (1976) concluded in his research of critical leader behavior in both business and the military:

The analysis made here indicates that within the organizational contexts of industry and military, distributions of critical behaviors by both leadership function and leadership style are reasonably similar (34).

Organization development is widely used in the Army to promote job enrichment, human relations training, assessment centers, and feedback (Umstot, 1980).

Understanding the differences and similarities in each other's culture can help eliminate or at least dampen some of the initial reservations that employers have about veterans.

While some employers see these differences as liabilities, other employers see these differences as assets. These employers include David T. Kearns, Chairman of Xerox Corporation; Edward A. Brennan, Chairman of Sears, Roebuck and Company; Ralph Larsen, Chairman of Johnson and Johnson Corporation; Ron Allen, Chairman of Delta Air Lines; and John F. Welch Jr., Chairman of General Electric Company (*Experience for Hire*, 1990). Each of these executives has come to appreciate the attributes that Army veterans possess. As a result, each has hired veterans within his respective firm.

While much has been discussed about the merits of hiring veteran officers, one author (Janowitz, 1960) cogently sums up the true differences between Army officers and civilian managers:

The character of military leaders which transcends economic, political, and sociological pressures is expressed in dedicated service to the country based on the principles of duty, honor, country. I submit that few men, not early inculcated with these ideals and who have not lived their whole productive life in

their expression, can learn, completely understand, or even comprehend this ideology which is the source of strength for the military leader in formulating his convictions and making his decisions. The military commander, who by this inner strength stands with clear conscience before his Maker and makes the decision to take away the most precious element in all the world--life--from his fellow man, can with understanding and unadulterated determination make the critical decisions on national security policy on which his nation's life depends. The greatest captain of industry can be but a comparative novice in this soul-searching undertaking (231).

CHAPTER V

OFFICER PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

In 1970, then Army Chief of Staff, General Westmoreland, directed the Army War College to conduct a study of the officer corps. Its purpose was to understand the problems that the corps experienced during the Vietnam War (Gabriel and Savage, 1978). Since that study, subsequent Chiefs of Staff up to and including the current Chief of Staff, General Sullivan, have strived to develop a professional officer corps.

This chapter explains the theory and application of the Officer Professional Development (OPD) Program. It traces a generic career path of a combat arms officer from precommissioning at either the U.S. Army Military Academy at West Point or from a civilian college's participation in the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) through a company level command assignment.

Note that leader development exists for officers, warrant officers, and non-commissioned officers. And while the theory is similar to all three categories of leaders, this study only emphasizes the development of officers. Secondly, as one reads about the Army's leader development process, the reader will notice how it mirrors that of many business'. The concept of a corporate-wide, building block and continuous process that holds the individual ultimately

responsible for one's development is shared by both the Army and business alike.

OPD Theory

In October 1987, the Army Chief of Staff initiated a leader development study. The mission of the study was twofold: 1) Determine the necessary changes requiring immediate attention. 2) Establish a direction for the long term (10 to 15 years). The group established six principles for the development and management of the commission officers (DA PAM 600-3):

- 1) Leader development must be doctrinally based.
- 2) Leader development must be responsive to the environment.
- 3) An officer's success should be measured in terms of the officer's contribution.
- 4) High quality soldiers deserve high quality leaders.
- 5) Adhere to the philosophy that leaders can be developed.
- 6) Leader development requires cooperation among the three pillars of institutional training, operational assignments, and self development.

The Army's philosophy centers on two goals: First, establish challenging yet realistic standards and then

enforce those standards (CED, 1991). Second, focus on leader development:

The leaders we develop must be competent in and dedicated to the profession of arms and experts in the art of war; they must be committed to upholding the dignity and respect of all soldiers, civilians, and subordinates; they must be dedicated to the nation; they must demonstrate physical and moral courage; and they must be forthright and candid in all their dealings. Finally, they must willingly embrace responsibility for the performance of their units and for every soldier and Army civilian entrusted to their care (DA PAM 600-32, 7).

In order to accomplish these goals, it identifies specific attributes that a leader must possess, and then it attempts to build upon those attributes. This includes ethical standards, technical and tactical proficiency, coaching skills, communication skills, problem solving skills, and team building skills.

The Army uses a process that centers on three pillars: institutional training, operational assignments, and self development. While each pillar has its own responsibilities, no one pillar is more important than the other two. Within each pillar a continuous cycle of education, training, experience, assessment, feedback, and reinforcement occurs.

While an officer rotates between institutional training and operational assignments throughout one's career, self development is always a part of the officer's developmental process.

This process is both progressive and sequential, so that the officer is trained prior to assuming the additional responsibility and authority. Ideally, the goal is to promote all officers to higher levels; realistically not all officers develop at the same rate. Thus no officer should be put into a position until that officer is prepared to assume that position. It is important to note that the premise for officer promotions is to promote those who have demonstrated the potential to perform at the next rank, rather than being used as a reward for past performance. Secondly, while the Army considers officers for promotions, Congressional directives determine how many officer can be promoted to each rank.

Institutional training. These institutions are the various schools used to train and educate leaders. They consist of each branch's Officer Basic Course (OBC) and Officer Advanced Course (OAC). Secondly, they include those schools which simultaneously train officers regardless of branch designation: Combined Arms Service Staff School (CAS3), Command and General Staff College (CGSC), and the Army

War College.

Operational assignments. While institutional training provides an officer with theoretical knowledge, operational assignments provide an officer with on the job training to apply that knowledge. A combat arms officer would expect assignments in a tactical unit where one's managerial and leadership skills can be put to the test through realistic and challenging training. Depending upon the officer's branch, the officer would serve in one or more of the following positions over an eight year period: section leader, platoon leader, executive officer, staff officer, company\troop or battery commander.

Self development. Neither institutional training nor operational assignments can guarantee success due to the myriad of skills required of an officer. Thus each officer is expected to have a program of self development to supplement the other two pillars. This can take the form of professional reading, research, correspondence courses, advanced civilian schooling, community service, or individual training. No one standard program exists for all officers. Rather each officer must tailor a program to meet one's needs.

However, the officer is not left to fend for himself

or herself. The OPD Program is outlined in the Military Qualification Standards System (MQS). By using these manuals, which each officer is expected to have, he or she can understand what is expected of an officer at the present and subsequent ranks. Then using both formal evaluations from the other two pillars as well as the officer's self evaluation, one can determine how to best capitalize upon the strengths and improve upon the weaknesses.

Precommissioning

West Point. Since its founding in 1802, West Point, or more officially the United States Military Academy, has produced military, government, and business leaders for the country. Today it provides approximately 20 percent of all commissioned officers to the Army (OPMD, 1991). It has the following mission:

The mission of the United States Military Academy is to educate and train the Corps of Cadets so that each graduate shall have the attributes essential to professional growth as an officer of the Regular Army, and to inspire each to a lifetime service to the nation (West Point Catalog, 5).

Leader development is the focus of the academy. It accomplishes this through various programs: academic, military,

and physical training.

The academic program's philosophy centers on preparing graduates who are enlightened; mentally creative, critical and resourceful; and morally courageous. It accomplishes this through small group learning that fosters initiative and participation. The curriculum balances an education in the arts and sciences while allowing cadets to pursue a field of study. Some cadets elect to further their education in a specific field by pursuing a major. This unique approach to education is accredited by the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools and the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET).

Because the emphasis is on developing future Army officers, military programs are ever present. Formal military education, summer training camps as well as the leadership positions within the Corps of Cadets provide the forum for nurturing leadership skills. Another option is for cadets to spend two weeks out of one summer with active Army units in the U.S., Korea, or Europe. Here the cadets serve in leadership positions, normally as platoon leaders, while being supervised by captains.

Lastly, physical training is required for all cadets at the intercollegiate, intramural, and club sport levels. The academy considers physical development as important as mental development.

A profile of the graduating class of 1994 highlights the caliber of men and women who are attracted to such an institution: Of the 12,759 (10,993 men and 1,766 women) applicants received, 1,177 men and 163 women were accepted. Eighty-six percent of the applicants represented the top fifth of their high school class. Their academic honors ranged from National Honor Society to Class Valedictorians. Their activities included varsity athletics to student body presidents (West Point Catalog).

ROTC. Then President Woodrow Wilson signed the National Defense Act in 1916 which, among other defense measures, created the Federal ROTC Program. Prior to 1916, the Army received its officers through West Point and private military schools such as the Virginia Military Institute, South Carolina's Citadel, and Vermont's Norwich University. The purpose of ROTC was to standardize the various officer training programs and to broaden the base of officer recruitment. Today over 400 colleges and universities in all 50 states offer ROTC. It serves as the largest officer generating institution for the Army commissioning over 70 percent of second lieutenants each year (OPMD)*.

* West Point and ROTC combined produce approximately 92 percent of Army lieutenants each year. The remaining eight percent come from the Officer Candidate School, Fort Benning, GA.

ROTC is not a degree, rather it is a curriculum that offers a series of courses taken in conjunction with a student's normal college curriculum. It is either a two year or a four year program depending upon the experience level of the individual cadet. Those with no military experience must enroll in the four year program which includes the basic program (Military Science's I and II) and an advanced program (Military Science's III and IV). Those with prior military experience, or four years of high school ROTC, or those who volunteer to attend a basic training camp prior to enrolling may opt for the advanced program.

ROTC's education philosophy centers on teaching leadership and soldiering skills under the guidance of Army officers and non-commissioned officers. The medium used is the classroom and field training exercises. Classes include leadership training, communications, tactics, land navigation, military and international law, first aid, weapons familiarity and physical fitness.

These skills are then honed and tested before commissioning at an Advanced Camp. This is a six week leadership training Course conducted at selected military installations. The purpose is to carefully evaluate the cadets to determine if they have the qualities to lead America's soldiers. Leadership, stress, and cohesion are the integral elements of the training.

While many desire to be Army officers, few are selected. With the scaling down of the military force, ROTC commissioning will decrease by 35 percent from 8,000 to 5,200 officers per year (Lon, 1991). Additionally, only about half of those will report for active duty. The remainder will serve out their tour of duty in the Army Reserve or Army National Guard. However, all of these men and women have undergone an experience that many of their civilian counterparts will never experience.

ROTC has gained wide respect over the years both inside and outside the Army. Past leaders such as General Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff during World War II, and General Powell, the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were ROTC graduates. Many senior field commanders of DESERT STORM were also ROTC graduates.

The men and women who enroll in ROTC also possess the academic and scholastic honors of their counterparts at West Point. Sixty-one percent of those candidates competing for ROTC scholarships were in the top fifth and 98 percent were in the top fourth of their respective high school classes; 81 percent earned their varsity letters; 55 percent were team captains; 78 percent were National Honor Society members (Lon, 1991).

Active Duty Assignments

The commissioned lieutenant can expect over the next eight years to attend at least two institutional schools and to have at least four operational assignments. Again, the self development pillar is the officer's responsibility to develop based upon one's self assessment and the formal assessments of the other two pillars. Table 3 provides an overview of a typical armor officer's career path over an eight year period. While the other combat arms have

TABLE 3
CAREER ASSIGNMENTS OF AN ARMOR OFFICER

Post-commissioning Years	Assignment
0 to .5	Officer Basic Course
.5 to 2.0	Platoon Leader
2.0 to 3.5	Executive Officer
3.5 to 4.0	Advanced Course
4.0 to 5.5	Staff Assignment
5.5 to 7.0	Command Assignment
7.0 to 8.5	CAS3/Staff Assignment

Source: DA PAM 600-3

different institutional training and operational assignments, the basic format is similar. Thus for the sake of brevity, the following discussion centers on an armor officer only. Also, it is important to note that exceptions do exist due to the needs of the unit and the individual development of the officer: This may lead to additional schooling or other assignments for the officer.

Basic course. This is the initial formal training that a commissioned officer receives. This training is geared towards preparing the officer for the first operational assignment. The officer receives leadership and management training in such areas as decision making, ethics and values, and oral and written communications. An officer is formally evaluated on both his academic and leadership performances. Also, training isn't limited to a classroom environment. Several field training exercises occur where an officer is rotated through various leadership positions so that he can put his theoretical training into practical application.

Operational assignments. Once the officer successfully completes his basic course, he is assigned duty positions applicable to his respective branch training. Regardless of one's branch an officer can expect an initial leadership

position that requires him or her to be responsible for 10 to 35 soldiers and \$100,000 to \$7 million worth of equipment.

An armor officer would be responsible for a tank platoon of 16 men and four tanks worth almost \$7 million. His responsibilities include the health and welfare of not only his men but their families as well. The platoon's training must be planned and executed on a daily basis. Thus the platoon leader must manage his goals, his soldiers' personal and professional needs, and the accountability and the serviceability of all the platoon's equipment.

A subsequent assignment that a lieutenant may have is being an executive officer (XO). The XO serves as second in command of an unit that ranges from 75 to 150 soldiers and officers. The XO's duties are various. He serves as the unit's headquarters platoon leader. He also serves as the unit's maintenance officer which requires him to oversee the operations of 20 to 50 wheel and tracked vehicles. He also serves as the unit's supply officer which requires him to supervise the accountability and serviceability of millions of dollars worth of equipment.

In each position that the leader serves, he is evaluated on a myriad of both personal and professional criteria (Appendix A). In turn the leader must evaluate his personnel. This makes counseling paramount for all so that

there are no surprises for either at evaluation time. Periodic sessions must be scheduled in which the respective parties discuss present and expected performances (Appendix A). A leader who fails to counsel his subordinates opens himself to subordinates appealing their evaluations. The chain of command at all levels is charged with the mission to ensure effective counseling is conducted. Once again, the leader is not left to fend for himself; unit training and Army manuals exist to assist the leader in proper counseling techniques.

Advanced course. Approximately three and a half years after commissioning an officer returns to the institutional training pillar for the advanced course. During this time frame lieutenants can expect to be promoted to the rank of captain. The advanced course's purpose "...is to prepare officers to command and train at the company/battery/troop level and to serve as staff officers at battalion and brigade" (DA PAM 600-3, 6). While the evaluation criteria are the same as the basic course, the curriculum is broadened to include those subjects that prepare an officer for the additional responsibility.

There is added concentration in subjects such as stress management, leadership, motivation, tactics, oral and written communication skills, and supply/maintenance

operations. Of special importance is the instruction in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), because commanders have the authority to impose non-judicial (non-court-martial) punishment.

Operational Assignments. Once the officer successfully completes the advanced course, he is again assigned to a unit that will assist in his professional development.

Few captains arrive into a unit and assume command. Battalion level commanders normally evaluate a newly promoted captain for about a year before placing him in command of soldiers. In the interim, a captain normally serves on the battalion staff as an adjutant (S1), or assistant operation's officer (S3), or logistical officer (S4). These are key positions within the battalion that require the captains to oversee the personal affairs, the daily operations, or logistics of a battalion. This is no easy task when considering the fact that the responsibilities can range from 500 to 1,000 soldiers and officers and over two hundred wheel and tracked vehicles besides the other thousands of pieces of equipment that must be accounted for and serviced over time.

A captain who successfully demonstrates his potential to command is selected for this coveted position. Depending upon the officer's branch, the commander's responsi-

bility includes from 75 to 150 soldiers and from \$10 million to over \$25 million worth of equipment.

The commander shares in the same responsibilities as the platoon leader. However, his span of control for planning, managing, and controlling resources is magnified four or five times that of the platoon leader's. Besides the responsibility to impose military justice and to train the unit to mission standards, more people oriented programs are becoming equally important. Some of these programs include: socialization, continuing education, drug and alcohol prevention (to include drug testing), race relations, promotions, and counseling.

The commander's responsibilities range far beyond his primary mission of leading his unit into combat. The care and concern for the health and welfare of his people must always be a priority.

While one may argue that this is strictly specific training, this study proposes that the leadership and management experiences represent general training skills: A mission has to be accomplished within a specific time frame with limited resources. This problem magnifies itself in field training exercises where the environment plays havoc on a leader. Internal and external factors continue to stress the leader as he makes decisions that can prove fatal even in peacetime due to the use of ammunition and the

multitude of vehicles that must be controlled during all hours of the day and night.

Another example of how generic leadership and managerial skills are key is that events outside the leader's immediate span of control must be planned for and executed. For instance, field training exercises often require a unit to deploy across the country or even to another country. The officer must plan for dual operations because while the unit in the field, garrison operations as well as the welfare of the deployed soldiers' families must also be cared for.

In order to adhere to the parameters of this paper two points need to be mentioned. First, the officer is now at the eighth to ninth year of service, so the subsequent stages of the Officer Professional Development Program will not be discussed. Secondly, the needs of the Army drastically reduce the number of captains required for senior ranks. As a result many captains will now leave the service either voluntarily or involuntarily. However, many officers may have decided before this point in time to leave the service.

Employers should carefully screen their veteran applicants for the type of assignments that they had. While many former captains are seeking employment, many more former lieutenants exist in the labor market. Obviously,

the captains were exposed to additional experiences that would benefit employers. However, the lieutenants gained a wide range of experiences that are also beneficial to employers. In both cases, these officers have a solid foundation in discipline, mission accomplishment, concern for subordinates, and the ability to solve problems, to make decisions, and to learn new skills.

CHAPTER VI

BUSINESS' SURVEYS

Methodology

The secondary sources presented in Chapters II through V provide evidence that veteran junior Army officers are an asset to business. However, this study desires to consider primary sources as well. The process used involved research of both civilian and military literatures on the subjects of work ethics and work experiences. These served as a basis in which to formulate a questionnaire (using an ordinal level of measurement) which was then sent to 50 American business presidents or chief executives.

The methodology used was to first select those sectors of the economy where veteran officers would most likely apply for employment in the private sectors (Table 5). The number of surveys per sector were based upon each sector's percentage of the Gross National Product (according to the Survey of Current Business) minus the nonapplicable sectors (Agriculture and Government). Then the Computerized Business Statistics Software Package Version 1.2 was used to generate random numbers.

Based upon the number of surveys per sector and each sector's randomly assigned numbers, the Compact Disclosure Database was used to select those firms which would participate in the survey. (The database contains over

12,000 public companies who report to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission). Once the firms were identified, a cover letter (Figure 2) and a questionnaire (Figure 3) were sent to either the president or the chief executive of each firm. Out of the 50 surveys that were mailed, 22 were returned. This translates into a 44 percent response rate.

TABLE 5
QUESTIONNAIRES PER INDUSTRY

Industry	Database	GNP (Billions)	GNP Percent	Surveys
Manufacturing	2,971	\$966.0	23.4	12
Transportation/ Communications	807	460.9	11.2	5
Wholesale	449	339.5	8.2	4
Retail	561	486.0	11.8	6
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate	2,440	896.7	21.8	11
Services	1,396	970.5	23.6	12
TOTAL	NA	\$4,119.6	100.0	50

Source: Survey of Current Business, April 1991.

The questionnaire was divided into nine questions with the 10th and 11th questions reserved for those who served in the military. Questions 1 through 5 and 10 were to be answered according to a scale of 1 to 5 (Worse to Better respectively). Questions 6 through 8 were to be answered based on a scale of four year increments. Question 9 was to be answered YES or NO depending upon whether or not the respondent's firm was a member of the Army Career and Alumni Program as discussed in Chapter IV. All of the respondents replied NO. If there had been any YES respondents, then those would have been evaluated separately. Question 11 was used to gather information about each of the business veteran's military experience (i.e. rank and years of service).

The questions did not address the Army specifically, rather they referred to veterans generally. This was done for two reasons: (1) Differentiating between the services was irrelevant. Previous studies concluded that work bound veterans benefited regardless of branch or military specialty (Andrisani et al, 1991). (2) To facilitate the respondents' task of addressing each question. Attempting to determine which of their veteran employees were in the Army may have demanded more time than the respondents would have cared to devote to answering the questions.

FIGURE 2

10610 Aero Vista
Fort Bliss, TX 79908
15 January 1992

Thomas Smith, President
ABC Incorporated
100 Main Street
Anytown, USA 12345

Dear Mr. Smith:

I am a U.S. Army officer attending graduate school at the University of Texas at El Paso. I'm writing a professional report on the marketability of junior Army officers, and I would like your assistance.

My premise is to show that although business and the military have different missions and thus different training programs, the professional development of junior Army officers provides a valuable source of junior leaders and managers for business.

Enclosed is a survey that I am asking you to complete and then return to me by 7 February. To ensure anonymity, please do not return this cover sheet with the survey. For your convenience, I have enclosed a self addressed stamped envelope.

I thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Encl.
As stated

MARK C. MALHAM
CPT, Armor
Graduate Candidate

FIGURE 3

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. How would you rate your veteran employees compared to your non-veteran employees for each of the listed attributes?

A. Adaptability (WORSE)	1	B. Decisiveness (WORSE)	1
	2		2
	3		3
	4		4
	(BETTER) 5		(BETTER) 5

- C. Dedication (WORSE) 1 D. Integrity (WORSE) 1
2 2
3 3
4 4
(BETTER) 5 (BETTER) 5

- E. Teamwork (WORSE) 1 F. Trainability (WORSE) 1
2 2
3 3
4 4
(BETTER) 5 (BETTER) 5

2. Overall, how would you rate the work ethics of your veteran employees compared to your non-veteran employees? (WORSE) 1
2
3
4
(BETTER) 5

3. In regards to the applicability in business, how would you rate the managerial and leadership skills that an officer learned in the military? (NO VALUE) 1
2
3
4
(VALUABLE) 5

4. How would you rate the military's ability to provide business a source of young leaders and managers? (NO VALUE) 1
2
3
4
(VALUABLE) 5

FIGURE 3 (CONT)

5. How would you rate the managerial and leadership skills of a veteran officer compared to those of a non-veteran with a comparable years of business experience (4 to 8 years)? (WORSE) 1
2
3
4
(BETTER) 5
6. If a veteran officer sought employment with your firm, how many years of military service would you consider optimal for him to have in order to best serve your firm's needs? 1 - 3
4 - 7
8 - 11
12 - 15
16 - 19
20 +
7. After how many years of employment in your firm could a typical manager expect to supervise 15 or more subordinates? 1 - 3
4 - 7
8 - 11
12 - 15
16 - 19
20 +
8. After how many years of employment in your firm could a typical manager expect to control \$1 million or more of resources? 1 - 3
4 - 7
8 - 11
12 - 15
16 - 19
20 +
9. Is your firm a member of the Army Career and Alumni Program? YES NO
- NOTE: IF YOU WERE IN THE MILITARY, PLEASE CONTINUE. IF NOT, THEN PLEASE STOP HERE. HOWEVER, IF YOU HAVE ANY OTHER COMMENTS, PLEASE FEEL FREE TO NOTE THEM ON BACK. THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION.
10. If you were in the military, how would you rate it in assisting in your professional development as a manager? (NO VALUE) 1
2
3
4
(VALUABLE) 5

FIGURE 3 (CONT)

11. A. Which branch of service were you in?
- B. What was the highest rank that you attained?
- C. What was your last assignment prior to leaving the service?
- D. If you commanded a unit, state the level.
- E. How many years did you serve?

THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION

Analysis of Responses

While the response rate represented less than half of those surveyed, the results do support previous studies on the benefits of hiring military personnel. And while the data are not statistically analyzed, weighted averages are provided to facilitate the reader's interpretation of the results.

When comparing key work attributes and overall work ethics of veteran employees compared to non-veterans employees, the respondents rate their veterans higher than their non-veterans. The results, which range from 3.32 to 3.64, are shown in Tables 6-1A through 6-2. It is important to note that while the responses indicate military personnel and not specifically Army officers, it can be inferred that Army officers would be rated higher due to their intensive socialization process that prepares them to assume higher positions of authority and responsibility.

The managerial and leadership experience that a junior Army officer receives is valued by the respondents. Table 6-3 demonstrates that the respondents consider the officer's experience as having an above average value to business (3.59). Table 6-4 demonstrates that the respondents consider the Army as an above average source of junior managers and leaders (3.36). When comparing the military experience of a veteran officer with a non-veteran who has a compar-

able number of years of business experience, the respondents rate the veteran officer higher than the non-veteran (3.45). Table 6-5 demonstrates this.

When considering the number of years that an officer should serve in order to benefit business, the respondents consider one tour as optimal (3.61 years). Table 6-6 demonstrates this. However, the longer that the officer is in the military the less beneficial is his experience.

Tables 6-7 and 6-8 demonstrate that the supervisory role of a typical business manager is 12 times longer than in the Army. Table 6-7 demonstrates that average number of years for a typical manager to supervise 15 or more employees is 6.39 years. Table 6-8 demonstrates that the average number of years for a typical manager to control \$1 million or more in resources is 6.75 years.

When asked of those that were in the military, how they would rate it as assisting in their development as managers, the respondents rated the military as above average (3.63). Note that only eight stated that they were in the military.

Responses

Question 1: How would you rate your veteran employees compared to your non-veteran employees for each of the listed attributes?

TABLE 6-1A

Question 1A: Adaptability

	<u>Scale</u>	<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Weighted Average</u>
(WORSE)	1	0	0
	2	2	4
	3	13	39
	4	5	20
	5	<u>2</u>	<u>10</u>
	TOTAL	22	73
	AVERAGE	NA	3.32

TABLE 6-1B

Question 1B: Decisiveness

	<u>Scale</u>	<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Weighted Average</u>
(WORSE)	1	1	1
	2	1	2
	3	8	24
	4	9	36
	5	<u>3</u>	<u>15</u>
	TOTAL	22	78
	AVERAGE	NA	3.55

TABLE 6-1C

Question 1C: Dedication

	<u>Scale</u>	<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Weighted Average</u>
(WORSE)	1	1	1
	2	1	2
	3	6	18
	4	13	52
	5	<u>1</u>	<u>5</u>
	TOTAL	22	78
	AVERAGE	NA	3.55

TABLE 6-1D

Question 1D: Integrity

	<u>Scale</u>	<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Weighted Average</u>
(WORSE)	1	0	0
	2	1	2
	3	10	30
	4	10	40
(BETTER)	5	<u>1</u>	<u>5</u>
	TOTAL	22	77
	AVERAGE	NA	3.50

TABLE 6-1E

Question 1E: Teamwork

	<u>Scale</u>	<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Weighted Average</u>
(WORSE)	1	0	0
	2	2	4
	3	6	18
	4	12	48
(BETTER)	5	<u>2</u>	<u>10</u>
	TOTAL	22	80
	AVERAGE	NA	3.64

TABLE 6-1F

Question 1F: Trainability

	<u>Scale</u>	<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Weighted Average</u>
(WORSE)	1	0	0
	2	2	4
	3	9	27
	4	9	36
(BETTER)	5	<u>2</u>	<u>10</u>
	TOTAL	22	77
	AVERAGE	NA	3.50

Question 2: Overall, how would you rate the work ethics of your veteran employees compared to your non-veteran employees?

TABLE 6-2

	<u>Scale</u>	<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Weighted Average</u>
(WORSE)	1	0	0
	2	1	2
	3	13	39
	4	8	32
(BETTER)	5	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
	TOTAL	22	73
	AVERAGE	NA	3.32

Question 3: In regards to the applicability in business, how would you rate the managerial and leadership skills that an officer learned in the military?

TABLE 6-3

	<u>Scale</u>	<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Weighted Average</u>
(NO VALUE)	1	0	0
	2	3	6
	3	4	12
	4	14	56
(VALUABLE)	5	<u>1</u>	<u>5</u>
	TOTAL	22	79
	AVERAGE	NA	3.59

Question 4: How would you rate the military's ability to provide business a source of young leaders and managers?

TABLE 6-4

	<u>Scale</u>	<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Weighted Average</u>
(NO VALUE)	1	0	0
	2	3	6
	3	10	30
	4	7	28
(VALUABLE)	5	<u>2</u>	<u>10</u>
	TOTAL	22	74
	AVERAGE	NA	3.36

Question 5: How would you rate the managerial and the leadership skills of a veteran officer compared to those of a non-veteran with comparable years of business experience?

TABLE 6-5

	<u>Scale</u>	<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Weighted Average</u>
(WORSE)	1	1	1
	2	2	4
	3	8	24
	4	8	32
(BETTER)	5	<u>3</u>	<u>15</u>
	TOTAL	22	76
	AVERAGE	NA	3.45

Question 6: If a veteran officer sought employment with your firm, how many years of military service would consider optimal for him to have in order to best serve your firm's needs?

TABLE 6-6

	<u>Scale</u>	<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Weighted Average</u>
	1 - 3	13	26
	4 - 7	8	44
	8 - 11	1	9.5
	12 - 15	0	0
	16 - 19	0	0
	20 +	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
	TOTAL	22	79.50
	AVERAGE	NA	3.61

Question 7: After how many years of employment in your firm could a typical manager expect to supervise 15 or more subordinates?

TABLE 6-7

<u>Scale</u>	<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Weighted Average</u>
1 - 3	7	14
4 - 7	7	38.5
8 - 11	5	47.5
12 - 15	3	40.5
16 - 19	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL	22	140.50
AVERAGE	NA	6.39

Question 8: After how many years of employment in your firm could a typical manager expect to control \$1 million or more of resources?

TABLE 6-8

<u>Scale</u>	<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Weighted Average</u>
1 - 3	7	14
4 - 7	6	33
8 - 11	7	66.5
12 - 15	0	0
16 - 19	<u>2</u>	<u>35</u>
TOTAL	22	148.50
AVERAGE	NA	6.75

Question 10: If you were in the military, how would you rate it in assisting in your professional development as a manager?

TABLE 6-10

	<u>Scale</u>	<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Weighted Average</u>
(NO VALUE)	1	1	1
	2	0	0
	3	2	6
	4	3	12
(VALUABLE)	5	<u>2</u>	<u>10</u>
TOTAL		8	29
AVERAGE		NA	3.63

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Both the Army and business have a vested interest in the marketability of junior Army officers. In order to maintain an effective fighting force, especially during periods of deep budget cuts, the Army needs to attract competent men and women to serve as officers. However, there is a need for twice as many junior officers (lieutenants and captains) than for senior officers (majors and colonels). In other words, the Army must sell itself as a career enhancer for employment in the private sector.

Business and government literature support this premise. Several studies (Andrisanni et al, 1991; Broom et al, 1963, CED, 1991; Detray, 1982; DOL, 1988; Magnum et al, 1989) conclude that military service can assist veteran's in their subsequent civilian occupations. This isn't due to specific training skills, but rather to general training skills such as a sense of discipline, an ability to learn new skills, and an ability to work well with others.

Business is interested in junior Army officers for two reasons. First, it recognizes the school systems' failure to effectively educate the future work force. As a result, it is forced to spend billions of dollars annually to train entry level applicants in basic skills. So business appreciates the dedication and the discipline

that veterans bring into the work place. Secondly, in order to remain internationally competitive, it recognizes the need to hire innovative, adaptable, and caring managers. Thus an officer's communicative, decision making, interpersonal, and problem solving skills are highly valued. A few of the various firms within selected industries that actively commit themselves to hiring junior Army officers include: Chase Manhattan Bank, Ford, Goodyear, Marriott Hotels, Rockwell, Sears, and Xerox.

However, for most officers, military experience becomes a liability beyond eight years of service. The Army's socialization process that established a solid foundation of general training skills within the first tour becomes rigidly ingrained in an officer in subsequent tours. Thus, a respective firm may have a difficult time acclimating a veteran officer in its culture after more than eight years of military service. Note that this problem isn't unique to the Army. Any organization that a young manager is initially associated with often instills values that may be difficult to change the longer that the manager is associated with that organization.

There are two areas that need further research. 1) Some employers initially have an unfavorable view of veterans, but over time their attitude becomes favorable. There is a need to understand the catalysts for this at-

titudinal change. 2) What is the relationship between the civilian earnings of managers who were veteran officers and managers who were not veteran officers?

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
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APPENDIX A

**SEE PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT
ON DA FORM 67-8-1**

For use of this form, see AR 623-108, proponent
agency is US Army Military Personnel Center

a. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE INITIAL		b. SSN	c. GRADE	d. DATE OF RANK Year Month Day	e. BR	f. DESIGNATED SPECIALTIES	g. PMOS/RD.	h. STA CODE																			
i. UNIT, ORGANIZATION, STATION, ZIP CODE OR APO, MAJOR COMMAND		j. REASON FOR SUBMISSION																									
k. PERIOD COVERED FROM _____ Year Month Day		m. NO OF MONTHS Year Month Day	n. MILPO CODE	o. RATED OFFICER COPY (Check one and date): <input type="checkbox"/> 1. GIVEN TO OFFICER _____ <input type="checkbox"/> 2. FORWARDED TO OFFICER _____		p. FORWARDING ADDRESS																					
q. EXPLANATION OF NONRATED PERIODS																											
PART II - AUTHENTICATION (Rated officer signature verifies PART I data and RATING OFFICIALS ONLY)																											
a. NAME OF RATER (Last, First, MI)		SSN	SIGNATURE																								
GRADE, BRANCH, ORGANIZATION, DUTY ASSIGNMENT																											
b. NAME OF INTERMEDIATE RATER (Last, First, MI)		SSN	SIGNATURE																								
GRADE, BRANCH, ORGANIZATION, DUTY ASSIGNMENT																											
c. NAME OF SENIOR RATER (Last, First, MI)		SSN	SIGNATURE																								
GRADE, BRANCH, ORGANIZATION, DUTY ASSIGNMENT																											
d. SIGNATURE OF RATED OFFICER		DATE	e. DATE ENTERED ON DA FORM 21	f. RATED OFFICER MPO INITIALS	g. SR MPO INITIALS	h. NO OF INCL																					
PART III - DUTY DESCRIPTION (Refer)																											
e. PRINCIPAL DUTY TITLE		f. SSI/MOS																									
g. REFER TO PART IIIa. DA FORM 67-8-1																											
PART IV - PERFORMANCE EVALUATION - PROFESSIONALISM (Refer)																											
h. PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE (In Items 1 through 14 below, indicate the degree of agreement with the following statements as being descriptive of the rated officer. Any comments will be reflected in b below.)							HIGH DEGREE LOW DEGREE 1 2 3 4 5																				
1. Possesses capacity to acquire knowledge/grasp concepts		2. Demonstrates appropriate knowledge and expertise in assigned tasks		3. Maintains appropriate level of physical fitness		4. Motivates, challenges and develops subordinates		5. Performs under physical and mental stress		6. Encourages candor and frankness in subordinates		7. Clear and concise in written communication		8. Displays sound judgment		9. Seeks self-improvement		10. Is adaptable to changing situations		11. Sets and enforces high standards		12. Possesses military bearing and appearance		13. Supports EO/EEO		14. Clear and concise in oral communication	
i. PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (Comment on any area where the rated officer is particularly outstanding or needs improvement)																											
1. DEDICATION 2. RESPONSIBILITY 3. LOYALTY 4. DISCIPLINE 5. INTEGRITY 6. MORAL COURAGE 7. SELFLESSNESS 8. MORAL STANDARDS																											

PERIOD COVERED	
PART V - PERFORMANCE AND POTENTIAL EVALUATION (Rater)	
a RATED OFFICER'S NAME RATED OFFICER IS ASSIGNED IN ONE OF HIS/HER DESIGNATED SPECIALTIES/MOS <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	
b PERFORMANCE DURING THIS RATING PERIOD REFER TO PART III DA FORM 67-8 AND PART III & D AND C DA FORM 67-8-1 <input type="checkbox"/> ALWAYS EXCEEDED REQUIREMENTS <input type="checkbox"/> USUALLY EXCEEDED REQUIREMENTS <input type="checkbox"/> MET REQUIREMENTS <input type="checkbox"/> OFTEN FAILED REQUIREMENTS <input type="checkbox"/> USUALLY FAILED REQUIREMENTS	
c COMMENT ON SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE PERFORMANCE REFER TO PART III DA FORM 67-8 AND PART III & D AND C DA FORM 67-8-1 DO NOT USE FOR COMMENTS ON POTENTIAL!	
d THIS OFFICER'S POTENTIAL FOR PROMOTION TO THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE IS <input type="checkbox"/> PROMOTE AHEAD OF CONTEMPORARIES <input type="checkbox"/> PROMOTE WITH CONTEMPORARIES <input type="checkbox"/> DO NOT PROMOTE <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Explain below)	
e COMMENT ON POTENTIAL	
PART VI - INTERMEDIATE RATER	
f COMMENTS	
PART VII - SENIOR RATER	
g POTENTIAL EVALUATION (See Chapter 4 AR 67-10)	h COMMENTS
	
A COMPLETED DA FORM 67-8-1 WAS RECEIVED WITH THIS REPORT AND CONSIDERED IN MY EVALUATION AND REVIEW <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO (Explain in h)	

OFFICER EVALUATION REPORT SUPPORT FORM

For use of this form, see AR 623-105; the proponent agency is DCSPER.

*Read Privacy Act Statement on Reverse before Completing this form***PART I - RATED OFFICER IDENTIFICATION**

NAME OF RATED OFFICER (Last, First, MI)	GRADE	ORGANIZATION
---	-------	--------------

PART II - RATING CHAIN - YOUR RATING CHAIN FOR THE EVALUATION PERIOD IS:

RATER	NAME	GRADE	POSITION
INTERMEDIATE RATER	NAME	GRADE	POSITION
SENIOR RATER	NAME	GRADE	POSITION

PART III - VERIFICATION OF INITIAL FACE-TO-FACE DISCUSSION

AN INITIAL FACE-TO-FACE DISCUSSION OF DUTIES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES FOR THE CURRENT RATING PERIOD TOOK PLACE ON _____

RATED OFFICER'S INITIALS _____ RATER'S INITIALS _____

PART IV - RATED OFFICER (Complete a, b, and c below for this rating period.)**a. STATE YOUR SIGNIFICANT DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES**

DUTY TITLE IS _____ . THE POSITION CODE IS _____

b. INDICATE YOUR MAJOR PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

c. LIST YOUR SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTIONS

SIGNATURE AND DATE

PART V - RATER AND/OR INTERMEDIATE RATER (Review and comment on Part IVa, b, and c above.
Ensure remarks are consistent with your performance and potential evaluation on DA Form 67-8.)

a. RATER COMMENTS (Optional)

SIGNATURE AND DATE (Mandatory)

b. INTERMEDIATE RATER COMMENTS (Optional)

SIGNATURE AND DATE (Mandatory)

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a)

1. AUTHORITY: Sec 301 Title 5 USC; Sec 3012 Title 10 USC.

2. PURPOSE: DA Form 67-8, Officer Evaluation Report, serves as the primary source of information for officer personnel management decisions. DA Form 67-8-1, Officer Evaluation Support Form, serves as a guide for the rated officer's performance, development of the rated officer, enhances the accomplishment of the organization mission, and provides additional performance information to the rating chain.

3. ROUTINE USE: DA Form 67-8 will be maintained in the rated officer's official military Personnel File (OMPF) and Career Management Individual File (CMIF). A copy will be provided to the rated officer either directly or sent to the forwarding address shown in Part I, DA Form 67-8. DA Form 67-8-1 is for organizational use only and will be returned to the rated officer after review by the rating chain.

4. DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of the rated officer's SSN (Part I, DA Form 67-8) is voluntary. However, failure to verify the SSN may result in a delayed or erroneous processing of the officer's OER. Disclosure of the information in Part IV, DA Form 67-8-1 is voluntary. However, failure to provide the information requested will result in an evaluation of the rated officer without the benefits of that officer's comments. Should the rated officer use the Privacy Act as a basis not to provide the information requested in Part IV, the Support Form will contain the rated officer's statement to that effect and be forwarded through the rating chain in accordance with AR 623-105.

CURRICULUM VITAE

CURRICULUM VITAE

Mark Campion Malham was born on 12 January 1958 in Gary, Indiana. The second son of Howell J. and Martha Malham, he graduated from Memorial High School, Houston, Texas, in May 1976 and entered the United States Army that summer. After a four year tour he left the service with the intention of obtaining a bachelor's degree in political science and receiving a commission in the Army. In 1982, he was the Distinguished Military Graduate from the University of Illinois at Chicago, and then he was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Regular Army. He has served as an armor platoon leader and executive officer in Germany, and as a company commander and staff officer with the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Bliss, Texas. In the fall of 1990, he entered the Graduate School at The University of Texas at El Paso.

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This professional report was typed by Mark C. Malham